Ajit Kumar Singh Vs The Baba Saheb Bhim Rao Ambedkar Bihar University

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Vikash Jain, J.@mdashThe present application has been filed on behalf of the petitioners praying for initiation of a contempt proceeding against the Respondents for alleged non-compliance of the order dated 13.4.2007 passed in CWJC No. 6519 of 2004, which was disposed of with certain directions as enumerated therein. At the very outset itself, learned counsel for the opposite parties has raised a preliminary objection, on the basis of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter the ''Contempt Act'') that the contempt petition is not maintainable as it is barred by limitation. He submits that such bar of limitation under the said provision is absolute and inflexible, as it does not also permit condonation of delay.

2. In response to the aforesaid objection, learned counsel for the petitioners had sought time and thereafter filed I.A. No. 8639 of 2013 for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter the "Limitation Act") in filing the contempt petition. It has also been submitted that this Court would be well within jurisdiction in condoning such delay.

3. For ready reference, the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt Act are reproduced below:--

"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.--No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

4. On a plain reading of the above provision, it is clear that the Court is precluded from initiating proceedings for contempt beyond the limitation period of one year from the date when the contempt is said to have been committed. The provision in terms does not provide for any exceptions or relaxations in that regard. It would thus appear that the provision of Section 20 is mandatory and automatically operates in the matter of civil contempt where a party approaches the Court for initiation of contempt proceedings by filing a petition alleging willful disobedience or violation of its order beyond the prescribed period of one year.

5. It is relevant to advert to the backdrop in which Section 20 of the Contempt Act itself came to be enacted. The Sanyal Committee observed in its Report at paragraph-8 of Chapter-X, in the context of the desirability of prescribing a period of limitation through enactment, that if the period had to be fixed by statute the same would necessarily have to be very short and provision would also have to be made for condoning delay in suitable cases. It was felt on the whole that instead of making any hard and fast rule on the subject, the matter be continued to be governed by the discretion of the Courts as before. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament on contempt of Courts (Bhargawa Committee) examined the report of the Sanyal Committee, and opined on the question of limitation that the contempt proceedings by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as early as possible and hence considered it necessary and desirable that a period of limitation should be specified in respect of action for contempt. This became the reason for introducing Section 20 of the Act. In other words, the object behind introduction of Section 20 was the early consideration of actions for contempt and not to brook delay in that regard.

6. It is equally relevant to note that the vires of Section 20 of the Act has been tested by various Courts and held to be constitutionally valid, as appears from the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Arthur Branwell Company Ltd. v. Indian Fibres Ltd. [1993(2) CLJ 182]; the Karnataka High Court in High Court of Karnataka Vs. Y.K. Subbanna and Others, ; and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Ratnamanikyam v. K.S.R. Sarma [ 1988(2) ALT 644].

7. In Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and Others, , while the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Contempt Act was not called in question, the Hon''ble Apex Court examined the interface between Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and Section 20 of the Contempt Act. It has been explained that providing a period of reasonable period of limitation for initiation of a contempt proceeding cannot be considered as abrogating or stultifying the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and Section 20 of the Constitution of India. It has been further been explained that just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. Its earlier decision in Dr. L.P. Misra Vs. State of U.P., holding that the procedure provided by the Contempt Act had to be followed even in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 215 was also taken note of.

8. The order dated 13.4.2007 passed by this Court on the writ petition in this case, inter alia, required the Vice-Chancellor to constitute a Committee of three members within a period of two months and such Committee to complete the exercise of considering the individual cases of the petitioners to ascertain whether their appointments were regular, irregular or illegal, within six weeks after the creation of the Committee. In case of necessity it was left open to the concerned party to seek extension of time by obtaining leave of the Court.

9. The contempt petition discloses that the petitioners filed a representation on 11.6.2007 enclosing a copy of the writ order, and subsequently the Committee had visited the College and submitted a report. No dates in this regard have however been furnished nor it is stated that leave of the Court was sought for any extension of time.

10. On these facts, therefore, the alleged violation of the writ order must be treated to have occurred no later than upon the expiry of two months and six weeks reckoned from 11.6.2007 at best. The default cannot be said to be a continuing one. The period of limitation of one year under Section 20 thus expired towards the end of September, 2008. Considering that the contempt petition has been filed on 16.12.2010, it must be held that the same is not maintainable as having become barred by limitation in terms of Section 20 of the Contempt Act, the provisions whereof mandatorily required to be observed.

11. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also fairly accepts that the contempt petition has been filed beyond the permissible time limit prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt Act. He however, submits that despite absence of a specific provision in Section 20 of the Contempt Act providing for condonation of delay, this Court would have power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

12. It has been held in Pallav Sheth (supra) that the Contempt Act is a special law. While considering Section 20 thereof, it was held that the said provision had to be interpreted reasonably. The Apex Court referred to its earlier decision rendered in State of West Bengal and others Vs. Kartick Chandra Das and others, wherein it was held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation under Section 19 of the Contempt Act stood prescribed as special law and consequently, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stood attracted. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act were thus applied in the backdrop of Section 20 of the Contempt Act as well in Pallav Sheth (supra).

13. On the same analogy, therefore, it is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable herein and the Court has power to condone delay where the contempt petition is barred by limitation under Section 20 the Contempt Act.

14. On going through the contents of I.A. No. 8639 of 2013 for condoning delay, it is found that the petitioners have not satisfactorily explained the reasons for delay beyond the statutory period of one year, save and except stating that they repeatedly approached the concerned authority and kept waiting for results based on oral assurances given to them. On their own saying, they came to know in June, 2009 that the Committee had already submitted its report but in good faith they waited for implementation of the said report for over a year and a half before they deemed it appropriate to approach this Court with the present contempt petition. The solitary ground seeking to explain the delay beyond the statutory period of limitation thus falls short of being satisfactory and as such this Court is not inclined to accept the same as sufficient cause for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The I.A. No. 8639/2013 is accordingly dismissed. This Court, therefore, holds that the contempt petition is barred by limitation. MJC No. 5155 of 2010 stands dismissed.