@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
A.P. Shah, J.@mdashThe petitioners are the Sarpanchs of Gram Panchayats of Bhuinj, Kikli, Chindhavli and Jamb, Taluka Wai, District Satara. There was a demand for creation of a separate Gram Panchayat of Kisanveernagar. The Standing Committee of Satara Zilla Parishad had passed a resolution on 27th July, 1984 for formation of the separate Gram Panchayat for Kisanveernagar. The proposed Gram Panchayat was to be formed out of the areas of the existing four Gram Panchayats. Section 5 of the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 contemplates a Panchayat for each village, but section 4(1) thereof authorises the Government to declare any local area or group of revenue villages as one village for this purpose and thereafter include or exclude any part of such area after consulting (1) the Panchayat concerned and (2) the Standing Committee of the Zilla Parishad. Pursuant to the resolution passed by the Zilla Parishad, Satara, the Commissioner, Pune Division, the respondent No. 2 herein, had issued notices to the aforesaid four Gram Panchayats with a view to consult them in respect of the proposal for establishment of the new Village Panchayat to be known as Kisanveernagar Gram Panchayat. All the four Panchayats opposed the formation of the new Gram Panchayat by passing resolutions. It appears that at that time the Government had taken a policy decision not to establish a new Gram Panchayat and a general stay was granted against the establishment of any such Panchayat. It appear that the stay was lifted sometime in 1988. Thereafter the respondent No. 2 issued the notification dated 25th August 1988 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub-section (1) of section 4 of the said Act, read with Government Notification, Rural Department No. VPA-1270-52138-E dated 8th December 1970 and declared the area comprising the revenue villages (1) Bhuinj, (2) Kikli, (3) Chindhavli, (4) Jamb and (5) Kisanveer Nagar in the Wai Taluka of Satara District to be five separate villages viz. (1) Bhuinj, (2) Kikli, (3) Chindhavli, (4) Jamb and (5) Kisanveer Nagar with effect from the date of publication of the said notification dated 25th August, 1988 in the official gazette. In pursuance of the aforesaid notification, the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Satara passed an order dated 13th October, 1988 and appointed Shri L.R. Yadav, Extension Officer (Panchayat), as Administrator u/s 160(1) for all the five village Gram Panchayats. The legality and validity of the notification dated 25th August, 1988 and the order dated 17th October, 1988 is sought to be challenged in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Mr. Ketkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised three contentions in support of the petition namely, (1) that there was no effective consultation inasmuch as there was no discussion or exchange of views and in any event having regard to the passage of time between the date of the alleged consultation and the final notification, a further consultation was necessary in view of the fact that a new elected body came into power in the meanwhile; (2) that the notification has been issued without notice and without hearing the individual members of the Panchayat who were compelled to vacate the office on reconstitution of the village Panchayats and (iii) that section 4(2)(b) is constitutionally invalid as it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as the said sub-section confers unbridled and uncanalised powers on the respondent No. 2.
3. So far as the first contention is concerned, it is now well settled that ordinarily and broadly "consultation" means communication of the views between the consulted and the consulter, on the subject and further exchange of thoughts thereabout. In
4. As regards the grievance of the petitioners that the notification u/s 3 was issued without notice and without hearing the individual members of the Panchayat, it is required to be noted that the hearing u/s 3 is in the nature of conditional legislation and, therefore, is not subject to the rules of natural justice any more than is legislature itself. The rules of natural justice are not applicable to legislative action plenary or subordinate. The procedural requirement of hearing is not implied in the exercise of legislative powers unless hearing was expressly prescribed. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision rendered on December 23/24, 1982 by the Bench consisting of Shah and Deshpande, JJ., in Writ Petition No. 706-A of 1982, Village Panchayat Chikalthane v. State of Maharashtra. In that case, the challenge was to the validity of section 3(2) of the Act on the ground that it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation for want of guidelines for the exercise of power. Repelling the contention, it was held that section 3 is in the nature of a conditional legislation and, therefore, laying down the policy or guidelines to exercise the power was unnecessary. It was emphasized that the exercise of power u/s 3(2) is conditioned by only two requirements viz. (1) previous publication as contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, (2) issuance of a notification by the Government after such previous publication. Once the Government publishes such a notification the legislation becomes complete and the other provisions of the Act are ipso facto attracted to the Corporation so constituted. The decision of the Division Bench was cited with approval in Sunderlal Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane Maharashtra, reported in 1989(3) Supreme Court Cases 396. The Supreme Court categorically held that in the absence of express statutory provision, the principles of natural justice are excluded from this process and there is no obligation to afford opportunity of being heard to the objector. It was observed that the intention of the Government in establishing Corporation under the Act is neither executive nor administrative. It is a legislative process. No judicial duty is laid on the Government in discharge of the statutory duties. The only question to be examined is whether the statutory provisions have been complied with. If they are complied with, then the Court would say no more. The argument of Mr. Ketkar that there was non compliance with the principles of natural justice is thus without any merit and must be rejected.
5. Now coming to the last argument of Mr. Ketkar in regard to challenge to the constitutional validity of section 4(2)(b), it will be useful to reproduce section 4 which runs as follows :---
Section 4. Declaration of village :---
(1) Every village specified in the notification issued under Clause (g) of Article 243 of the Constitution of India shall be known by the name of that village specified in that notification.
Provided that where a group of revenue villages or hamlets or other such administrative unit or part thereof is specified in that notification to be a village, the village shall be known by the name of the revenue village hamlet, or as the case may be, administrative unit or part thereof, having the largest population;
(2) Where the circumstances so require to include or exclude any local area from the local area of a village or to alter the limits of a village or that a local area shall cease to be a village, then the notification issued in the like manner after consultation with the Standing Committee and the panchayat concerned, at any time may provide to
(a) include within, or exclude from, any village, any local area or otherwise alter the limits of any village, or
(b) declare that any local area shall cease to be a village, and thereupon the local area shall be so included or excluded or the limits of the village so altered, or, as the case may be, the local areas shall cease to be a village."
6. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Government has power to form or establish a new village, whereas sub-section (2) confers power on the Government to include or exclude any area from any village or otherwise alter the limits of any village. The Government has framed rules u/s 4(1). The rules contemplate an elaborate enquiry in the matter before forming or establishing a new Village Panchayat. The powers under sub-section (2) are required to be exercised by issuing a notification in the like manner. Thus it is clear that the authorities are required to follow the procedure prescribed by the rules framed u/s 4(1) before issuing the notification u/s 4(2). But that apart, as held by the Division Bench in Chikalthane Village Panchayat''s case (supra) since section 3 is in the nature of conditional legislation laying down policy or guidelines to exercise the power was unnecessary. Under the circumstances, the argument of Mr. Ketkar that section 4(2)(b) confers unbridled and uncanalised power on the Government cannot be accepted. In our opinion, section 4 is valid in its entirety.
In the result, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
7. Petition dismissed.
