A.S. Chandurkar, J.@mdashThe original plaintiff has filed the present appeal under provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 being aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court rejecting the application for temporary injunction seeking to restrain the respondent from alienating the suit property. It is the case of the appellant that on 7-10-2013 an agreement for purchasing a house property for consideration of Rs. 14,00,000/- was entered into with the respondent. Earnest amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- was paid to the respondent. As the respondent did not execute the sale deed as agreed, the appellant filed suit for specific performance of aforesaid agreement. In said suit the appellant sought relief of interim injunction seeking to restrain the respondent from alienating the suit property. By the impugned order trial Court held that the appellant had failed to make out a prima facie case and hence rejected the said application.
2. Shri U.J. Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the trial Court erred in doubting genuineness of agreement dated 7-10-2013. It was submitted that the earnest amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- had been paid to the respondent and a legal notice had also been issued prior to filing the suit for specific performance. The stand taken by the respondent that his daughter was required to be given medical treatment was not substantiated by any material on record and hence said stand should not have been accepted by the trial Court. He further submitted that if the interim injunction as prayed was not granted and if the suit property was alienated, the same would result in multiplicity of proceedings.
3. Shri S.A. Mohta, learned counsel for the respondent opposed aforesaid submissions and pointed out that material particulars in the agreement dated 7-10-2013 were handwritten while other contents were typed. He also sought to demonstrate that the signatures of the appellant on a sale deed executed on 17-4-2014 to which the appellant was a witness was different from the signature made on the application for injunction filed this Court. He further submitted that in case of alienation during pendency of the suit the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply.
4. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and I have gone through the documents filed on record.
5. The suit as filed is for specific performance of agreement dated 7-10-2013. The trial Court on a prima facie view found that various material contents of the agreement had been handwritten while other portions had been typed. It thereafter proceeded to accept the plea as raised by the defendant in his reply that it was necessary for him to undertake medical treatment of his daughter. On that basis the trial Court refused to grant interim injunction.
6. Even assuming the agreement dated 7-10-2013 to have been actually entered into by the parties, it has not been demonstrated that the protection available by virtue of provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be insufficient to protect the interest of the original plaintiff. Any alienation of the suit property would always be subject to final adjudication of aforesaid suit. Merely because the same could result in multiplicity of proceedings cannot be a ground to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiff. In the facts of the present case it cannot be said that the view as taken by the trial Court is not a possible view or that such view is not permissible in law. As the protection under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is available in case the suit property is alienated, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order. It is however clarified that observations made by the trial Court in the impugned order as well as observations made hereinabove are only for purpose of deciding the application below Ex. 5 and the suit shall be decided after considering the entire evidence on record. Subject to what is stated hereinabove, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Appeal is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. Pending civil applications also stand disposed of.
