Chunder, J.@mdashThis case raises a point which has never been the subject of adjudication by this Court. In the present case, three accused persons Meghnad alms Megha Bag, Gour Patra and Almash Mollah are charged with committing offence triable by a Court of Sessions on the river Hooghly opposite to Batanagar. Preliminary enquiry was held into their case by one of the Presidency magistrates of Calcutta and they have been committed to this Court for trial.
2. A question has been raised whether this Court has jurisdiction. The first point that has to be considered is whether the commitment itself has been a valid one. Ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the Presidency magistrate extends to the town of Calcutta but u/s 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is provided that-
Every Presidency magistrate shall exercise jurisdiction within the Presidency town for which he is appointed and within the limits of the port of such town and of any navigable river or channel heading thereto, as such limits are defined under the law for the time being in force for the regulation of port or port-dues.
3. It is not doubted that Hooghly is a navigable river which leads to the port of Calcutta, which is the port of the town of Calcutta. Therefore, u/s 20, the commitment was made by proper court. The question then arises whether a Presidency magistrate should have made a commitment to this Court or to the proper Court of Sessions, namely, the Court of Sessions 24-Parganas within the local limits of the jurisdiction of which Batanagar is. Ordinarily, the law is that a Presidency magistrate, a district magistrate, a sub-divisional magistrate and a magistrate of the first class or any specially empowered magistrate may commit a person for trial to the Court of Sessions or to High Court for any offence tribal by such court. The offences in the present case are under Sections 399, 397, and 402, Indian Penal Code, and they are shown as tribal by a Court of Sessions in the schedule.
4. It has already been held that the High Court is not a Court of Sessions and a Presidency town is not a Session division. It has been so held in two decisions of this Court in Emperor v. Harendra Chandra Chakravarti (1924) ILR 61 Cal. 980 and in Sukumar Majwmdar v. Emperor (1932) ILR 59 Cal. 1248. u/s 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court may take cognizance of any offence upon commitment made to it "in the manner provided in the code". This leaves unaffected any right of the High Court under the Letters Patent under the Indian High Court Act, 1861, or under any of the other Acts. In Section 206 of the Code it has been provided in Clause 2 that save as hereinafter otherwise provided no person tribal by a Court of Sessions shall be committed for trial to the High Court. Therefore, the question arises whether this Court has got jurisdiction of its own to try such a case as the present or the proper Court of Sessions outside Calcutta. It is clear that ordinarily such cases should be committed to the proper Court of Sessions outside Calcutta and not the High Court. But we have powers under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court which, as I have pointed out, are let unaffected by Section 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Clause 24 of the Letters Patent runs as follows:
We do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal (now at Calcutta) shall have extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction over all persons residing in places within the jurisdiction of any court now subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and shall have authority to try at its discretion any such persons brought before it on charges preferred by the Advocate-General or by a magistrate or other officer specially empowered by the Government in that behalf.
5. Therefore, under Clause 24 of the Letters Patent this High Court has original criminal jurisdiction of an extraordinary kind not mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure but preserved by that Code u/s 194 to try any case of any person whose case has been brought before it by a commitment by any magistrate which will include a Presidency magistrate.
6. Therefore, jurisdiction of the High Court in a case of this nature under Clause 24 of the Letters Patent is co-extensive with that of any Court of Sessions outside the Presidency town of Calcutta over the offence which was committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court of Sessions.
7. This question came up before the High Court of Bombay and before the High Court of Madras. We need not go into the case of Queen-Empress v. James Ingle (1891) ILR 16 Bom. 200 because that case was fully considered in the decision in Ganapathy Chetty v. Rex (1919) ILR 42 Mad. 791. In the Madras case a murder took place at Chingleput outside the Presidency town of Madras. It was considered convenient as the witnesses resided within the Presidency town to have the case enquired into by the Presidency magistrate of Madras. The Presidency Magistrate committed the case to the High Court Sessions at Madras. Before the case came up for hearing a rule was obtained before the Criminal Appellate Divisional Bench of that High Court for quashing the commitment to the High Court Sessions. It is to be noted that in that case the commitment proceeding before the magistrate of Madras was without jurisdiction but the Madras High Court pointed out that such absence of jurisdiction on the part of the magistrate was cured by Section 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present we have stronger case, than that, inasmuch as, the commitment was made by the court having proper jurisdiction, namely, the court of the Presidency magistrate of Calcutta which, as I have already pointed, has legal jurisdiction u/s 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court referred to Section 24 of the Letters Patent and pointed out that the High Court, once a commitment has been made to it, was competent to proceed with its trial. Clause 24 of the Letters Patent is the same for Madras word by word as it is for the High Court at Calcutta. Therefore, it is clear that in the present case a valid commitment having been made by the Presidency magistrate of Calcutta to this Court and this Court having jurisdiction under Clause 24 of the Letters Patent, this Court is competent to proceed with the case in its Original Criminal Jurisdiction. It must be made clear that being an extraordinary Jurisdiction, the High Court may quash the commitment and may direct the Presidency or other magistrate to commit to the proper Court of Sessions outside Calcutta if that course appears more just.
8. There is another clause under the Letters Patent, viz., Clause 33 which runs as follows:
We do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal (now at Calcutta) shall have and exercise all such criminal jurisdiction as may now be exercised by the said High Court as a Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty or otherwise in connection with maritime matters or matters of prize
9. There is grave doubt whether an ordinary criminal offence of dacoity in the river or connected with such dacoity is really within the words "in connection with the maritime matter or "matters of prize". It is not necessary for me to give a final decision on that point in this case, because, as I have pointed out, there is clear jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 24 of the Letters Patent. This view is confirmed by two similar decisions of two Presidency High Courts. The very doubtful question of the application of Clause 33 of the Letters Patent need not be decided in this case.
10. The result, therefore, is that though the offence was committed outside the ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction of this Court, the commitment having been actually made by the Presidency magistrate to this Court, and there being no just reason against it, this Court can try this case in its Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction. The plea of the accused may now, therefore, be taken on the charge.
