1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, given in its revisional jurisdiction u/s 32 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, by which an appellate order of a Judge of the Small Cause Court, reversing an order of the Additional Rent Controller, was set aside and the order of the Additional Rent Controller restored. The petitioner before us is a private limited company and is the owner of premises Nos. 21 and 22 Rupchand Roy Street. Calcutta. In 1948, the respondent firm obtained a monthly tenancy of a shop-room on the ground floor of premises No. 22 Rupchand Roy Street and a godown on the ground-floor of premises No. 21 Rupchand Roy Street, the two together forming the subject-matter of the tenancy The contractual rent was Rs. 3501- per month. In September, 1953, the respondent firm made an application before the Additional Rent Controller, Calcutta, for standardisation of the rent. The Additional Rent Controller held that the premises had been in existence in December, 1941, but were not let out and, therefore, section 9 (1) (e) of the Rent Control Act would apply. Under that section, the Rent Controller would have to determine what rent would have been reasonably payable for the premises, if they had been let out on the 1st of December, 1941, because such rent would be the basic rent for the purposes of standardisation. In order to determine the rent which would have been reasonably payable, the Rent Controller took into account the rent paid on account of a shop-room situated at premises No. 3A Rupchand Roy Street which stood almost opposite to the premises in the present case. The rent paid for the shop-room in premises No 3A Rupchand Roy Street on the prescribed date, that is the 1st of December, 1941, was Rs. 481- per month. The Rent Controller made an addition of 50 per cent to that amount in the view that the rooms in question before him were of a somewhat superior quality, and on applying the rate so ascertained to the floor-space of the present tenancy and making a further addition on account of a larger road frontage, he determined the basic rent at Rs. 1251- per month. Accordingly, he fixed the standard rent at Rs. 143-12-0.
2. The petitioner before us appealed to the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. The appeal was heard by the learned Fourth Judge who held, in agreement with the Additional Rent Controller, that the provisions of section 9 (1) (e) of the Act were applicable, but he held, at the same time, that the premises which were the subject-matter of the tenancy before him were altogether dissimilar to the shop-room at 3A Rupchand Roy Street, which had been taken as a comparable unit. Since, besides that shop-room at No. 3A Rupchand Roy Street, the respondent firm had not referred to the rent borne by any other comparable premises, the learned Judge held that the respondent firm''s case for a reduction of the contractual rent had not been proved and accordingly he dismissed its application.
3. Thereupon, the respondent firm moved this Court u/s 32 (4) of the Act and obained a Rule. The Rule was heard by Das Gupta and Guha, JJ., who made it absolute and restored the order of the Additional Rent Controller upon setting aside the order of the learned Fourth Judge of the Small Cause Court. The landlord company now wants a certificate from us for the purpose of going up to the Supreme Court on further appeal.
4. The judgment sought to be ''appealed from is one of reversal. Mr.. Talukdar, who appears on behalf of the petitioner company, contended that his client was entitled to the certificate prayed for as of right, inasmuch as the proposed appeal satisfied the valuation test and, therefore came directly within the words of Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution. Failing sub-clause (a) of Article 133 (1), Mr. Talukdar contended that the case should, at least, be certified as a fit case under sub-clause (c), because three important questions of law were involved.
5. I may say at once that the contention that sub-clause (c) of Article 133 (1) applied was not in the end pressed by Mr. Talukdar. The application must, therefore, succeed,. if it can be brought within Article 133 (1) (a) and must fail, if it is outside that provision of the Constitution.
6. Mr. Gupta, who appears on behalf of the respondent firm, contended that there were two reasons why the present case could not be said to come within the provisions of Article 133 (1) (a). In the first place, there was no ''court of first instance'' here, the Additional Rent Controller not being such a Court; and, in the second place, the value of the subject-matter, at least the subject-matter still in dispute on appeal, could not be said to be of the statutory limit.
7. I would first dispose of the point on which I am inclined to hold in favour of the petitioner. Mr. Talukdar pointed out that the contractual rent wa Rs. 350/- per month which had been reduced on standardisation to Rs. 143-12-0. The difference between the two amounts was Rs. 206-4-0, which was the measure of the petitioner''s monthly loss. If the annual loss was computed on the basis of the monthly loss and such loss capitalised on the basis of twenty years'' purchase, the resultant figure would far exceed the statutory limit of Rs. 20,000/-. Mr. Talukdar''s contention was that the petitioner''s income from the premises was an annual income and the liability of the respondent firm was a recurring liability. In those circumstances, Mr. Talukdar contended, he was entitled to look ahead and measure the prospective loss, which was the petitioner''s stake in the case and, therefore, the subject-matter of the dispute, on the basis that the tenancy was going to last for at least twenty years.
8. Mr. Gupta conceded that if the rent, as finally fixed by the order of the High Court, could be taken as the rent which would remain unaltered for at least twenty years, the statutory limit of valuation would clearly be reached. He, however, contended that it was by no means certain that the petitioner would continue to suffer the loss imposed on him by the order sought to be appealed from, because/ under the provisions of the new Rent, Control Act, the rent fixed under the Act of 1950 might be revised on an application of the petitioner after five years. Whether those five years would have to be computed from the date of the order of the Additional Rent Controller or from the date of the High Court''s order, the period would end considerably before the expiry of twenty years. If, by that time, the market value of the property increased, the petitioner would bet entitled to make on application u/s 11 (1) of the Act and thereupon the ''fair rent'', as defined in the new Act, which in the facts of this case would mean the rent fixed under the Act of 1950, might be revised to the extent provided for in sub-section (3) of section 11. It was, therefore, by no means certain that the petitioner would continue to suffer the loss of Rs. 206-4-0 per month and, consequently, it would be unrealistic to compute the value of the proposed appeal on the footing that the rent finally fixed by the High Court''s order would continue to remain chargeable for the premises for twenty years or more.
9. I do not think that it will be right to hold that the proposed appeal does not satisfy the valuation test, merely on the ground that, in certain circumstances, it may be possible for the petitioner to apply for a revision of the rent and that in certain circumstances, a revision may be made in its favour. The market value of the premises may, instead of increasing, decrease and an application made by the petitioner may or may not succeed. The possible change of circumstances, on which Mr. Gupta based his argument, would depend upon the occurrence of several external events, although it would also depend on some action taken by the petitioner itself. I do not think it will be right to take notice of uncertainties and refuse to proceed on the basis of facts as they are now. It is conceded that if nothing is done by either of the parties, the present rate of rent will continue even under the new Act. If the present rate continues, the amount of further rent which the petitioner claims from the respondent and in respect of which the respondent has been freed of liability, will obviously be above Rs. 20,0001-. I would, therefore, hold that the proposed appeal satisfies the valuation test.
10. The other objection raised by Mr. Gupta appears to me to be an insuperable '' one. I would recall that Mr. Talukdar is no longer insisting on a certificate under sub-clause (c) of Article 133 (1). He is asking for a certificate under sub-clause (a) which requires that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal should be not less than Rs. 20,0001-. The provision, therefore, presupposes that there must be a ''Court of first instance. The ''Court of first instance'' obviously means the Court where the suit or proceeding was first initiated. That the tribunal presided over by the Additional Rent Controller was a tribunal of first instance in that sense; admits of no doubt. The only question is whether it was a Court within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (a).
11. Mr. Gupta contended that the word ''Court'', as used in Article 133 (1) (a), must be construed as meaning a ''Court'' as contemplated by the CPC and the Civil Courts Act. He pointed out that Article 133 had its counterpart in or was rather a combination of sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same expression ''Court of first instance'' occurred in section 110 of the Code and it had been held that the expression ''Court'' there meant ''Civil Court''. Article 133 (1) (a), Mr. Gupta contended, was no wider and the word ''Court'', occurring in the expression ''Court of first instance'' as used in the Article, bore the same meaning that it bore in section 110 of the Code, first, because the provisions in the CPC and the Constitution in this regard were obviously co-extensive and, secondly, there were indications in the Constitution itself that where some body or authority, acting judicially but not satisfying the conditions of being a Court, was contemplated, a different word and not the word ''Court'' had been used in the Constitution.
12. It appears to me to be unarguable that if one limits oneself to section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the expression ''Court of first instance'', as occurring there, must be understood as contemplating ''Civil Courts''. The question was considered in some detail in the case of Balasubramania and Company v. Penukonda Radhakrishnamurthi (1) [I. L. R. (1950) Mad. 245], although what the learned Judges had to decide there was whether or not an Arbitrator was a Court within the meaning of section 110 of the Code. That difference in the facts makes no distinction. By a process of reasoning with which I respectfully agree and by reference to several sections of the Code, the Madras High Court reached the conclusion that the word ''Court'' in the expression ''Court of first instance'', occurring in section 110, meant one of the Courts in the hierarchy of civil Courts in the country. In my view, there is no escape from that conclusion. Sections 9 and 15 of the Code obviously contemplate civil Courts and it cannot possibly be contended or held that the same expression, occurring in another section of the Code, bears a different meaning, particularly since there is nothing in section 110 which compels a different construction of the word. In this Court it has been held in the case of Rai Bahadur Ramprosad Rajgharia v. British Insulated Callender''s Cables Ltd. (2) (57 C. W. N. 540). that the Rent Controller is not a Court for the purposes of section 144 of the Code. He is no more a Court within the meaning of section 110.
13. Mr. Talukdar contended that the tribunal presided over by the Rent Controller had been held to be ''a Court'' for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act and his submission was that we should concede the same status to the Rent Controller for the purposes of Article 133 (1) (a) as well. Somewhat curiously, Mr. Talukdar was not prepared to contend that the expression ''Court'' in Article 133 (1) (a) would cover any tribunal acting judicially, but he simply contended that it ought to be construed as covering the Rent Controller, functioning under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act. As was observed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the case to which I have already referred, the fact that a particular authority can be deemed to be a Court for the purposes of a particular statute, cannot necessarily lead to the result that it should be deemed to be a Court for the purposes of all enactments. Mr. Talukdar also contended that the Rent Controller heard evidence, decided issues between the contending parties before him and pronounced judgments. He had, therefore, all the trappings of a Court and consequently could be properly held to come within the description of a Court'' as given in Article 133 (1) (a). I am quite clear in my mind that the principles to which Mr. Talukdar was referring are relevant in a totally different context. Only when there is a question as to whether a particular tribunal acts or does not act judicially so as to be amenable to certain supervisory jurisdictions does it fall to be decided whether it does or does not discharge the functions ordinarily discharged by a Court in the sense of deciding a ''lis'' before it. Those principles have no application where one has to decide the true meaning of the expression ''Court'' as occurring in a particular statute, far less when the word appears in the Constitution.
14. The second branch of Mr. Gupta''s argument was that apart from the fact that the word ''Court'', as used in section 110 of the CPC could only mean a ''civil Court'' in the ordinary sense and that Article 133 (1) (a) which embodies the same provision could not reasonably or satifactorily be construed as bearing a different meaning, there were indications in the Constitution itself that the word ''Court'', as used in the Constitution, did not cover or comprise bodies or tribunals which were not Courts in the sense of the ordinary Courts or to be more precise, Courts as contemplated by the Civil Courts Act. It was pointed out that Article 136 (1) also dealt with appeals to the Supreme Court, although they were appeals by special leave, but in describing the authorities from whose decision an appeal by special leave would lie, the Constitution used the words "any court or tribunal in the territory of India." It is quite clear that in Article 136 (1) at least, the'' framers of the Constitution did not intend to describe by the word ''Court'' authorities or tribunals which were not Courts in the strict sense of the term. For such bodies or authorities it used a different word, ''tribunal'' Likewise, in Article 227 which is concerned with the powers of superintendence of the High Court, the trainers of the Constitution have not been content with using the word ''Court'', but have used the expression "all courts and tribunals." In the vocabulary of the Constitution, therefore, court and tribunal are not synonymous and the word ''Court'' does not, in the contemplation of the Constitution, cover any body or authority which is not a Court in the strict sense of the term. Since in Article 136 (1), which also deals with appeals to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution did not use only the word ''Court'', but used two words ''court'' and ''tribunal'' and since in Article 227 also, they used the same two words, it cannot reasonably be held that in Article 133 (1) (a), they intended to combine the denotation of those two words under one of them, namely, the word ''Court'' and make it bear the combined and enlarged meaning. Indeed, if it was intended to give a right of appeal even in cases where the tribunal of first instance was not a Court in the strict sense of the term, it is difficult to understand why the framers of the. Constitution should not have spoken. of "dispute in the court or tribunal of first instance," following the manner of expression used in Articles 136 (1) and 227, but should have used the single word ''Court''. The conclusion appears to me to be inescapable that the word, ''court'' in Article 133 (1) (a) does not cover any body or tribunal which is not a Court within the meaning of the CPC or the Civil Courts Act and, therefore, it does not cover the Rent Controller.
15. The position, therefore, is that although the proposed appeal satisfies the valuation test so far as the monetary value of the dispute is concerned, it does not satisfy the other condition, namely, the condition of there having been a dispute of that value in a Court of first instance. That being so, the application does not come within Article 133 (1) (a) and, therefore, cannot be allowed. For the reason given above, this application is dismissed with costs--the hearing-fee being assessed at three gold mohurs.
Sarkar, J.
I agree.
