Debangsu Basak, J.@mdashThe appeal is directed against a decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Asansol rendered in M.A.C. Case No. 85/2001.
2. The Appellant met with an accident on February 3, 2000. She was initially admitted to a hospital at Asansol for treatment, and thereafter, shifted to a nursing home at Asansol and then to another nursing home at Kolkata.
3. At the time of the accident the appellant was an employee of a company drawing a salary of Rs. 5,000/- per month, and was 48 years of age.
4. The appellant filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. She claimed compensation for loss of income, medical expenses, pain and suffering and compensation on account of disfiguration and permanent disablement.
5. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Asansol allowed compensation of a sum of Rs. 1,95,000/- on the basis of its finding that the appellant had an annual income of Rs. 60,000/- and that on the date of the accident the age of the appellant was 48 years. The extent of disablement was found to be 25 per cent. The multiplier of thirteen was applied to arrive at the figure of Rs. 1,95,000/-. A sum of Rs. 11,000/- was awarded as medical expenses and a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was awarded for pain and suffering. An aggregate of Rs. 2,40,000/- was awarded by the Tribunal. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the appeal.
6. Mr. Krishanu Banik learned Advocate for the appellant submits that, the medical expenses incurred by the appellant for treatment of the appellant must be allowed. Requisite evidence in support of such claim was on record. The Tribunal erred in not appreciating such evidence. The order impugned does not give any reason as to why the evidence in support of the medical expenses was not sufficient. He submits that, his client is entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,69,920/- for the medical expenses incurred.
7. He submits that, the Tribunal ought to have considered the disablement suffered by the appellant to be total as both her legs were lost due to the accident. He relies upon 1976 Accidents Claims Journal 141 (Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr.) in this regard.
8. He relies upon
9. Mr. Pahari for the Respondent No. 1 contends that there is no error in the order impugned passed by the Tribunal for this Court to interfere. He submits that, the Tribunal proceeded on a correct basis to quantify the quantum of compensation. The claim for the medical expenses was correctly reduced. The partial permanent disability of the appellant was taken into compensation and the appellant was adequately compensated in that regard. He relies upon
10. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties before us and the material made available on record.
11. The appellant before us met with an accident on February 3, 2000. She was initially admitted to a hospital at Asansol and, thereafter, taken to a nursing home at Asansol ultimately to be to be treated at Kolkata. The treatment at Kolkata spanned over several visits by the appellant. The appellant claims compensation for the medical expenses incurred by her in such treatment. She had adduced evidence in support of the medical expenses incurred by her before the Tribunal.
12. We have considered the evidence towards medical expenses produced by the appellant. It was not suggested before us by the Respondent No. 1 that the medical expenses incurred by her were not towards the treatment of the appellant consequent to the accident. The Tribunal did not allow the claim on the ground that the appellant did not examine the persons who had issued the bills of medical expenses. The bills issued by the nursing home at Kolkata did not give any reason about the receipt of the money from the appellant.
13. We have considered the receipts issued by the nursing home at Kolkata. These are receipts issued by the nursing home. The original receipts were produced in evidence. The bills and receipts for the medical expenses were also produced in original by the appellant. The appellant came into possession of such original bills and receipts in course of her treatment. These according to us are sufficient evidence of the appellant incurring the quantum of the medical expenses as would appear from the bills and receipts. It would be harsh and in fact unjust for the Tribunal to require an applicant before it to produce all the persons who had issued the bills and the receipts as witnesses before it to establish the veracity or otherwise of such bills and receipts. In any event, the bills and receipts are marked as exhibits. The appellant is one of the contracting parties to the bills and receipts. In her evidence she stated that she had incurred those expenses as reflected in the bills and receipts. The truth of the contents of such exhibits stands established by such oral evidence of the appellant. There is no contrary evidence on record to doubt the veracity of the bills and receipts. The appellant was entitled to be reimbursed for the entire amount of the medical expenses that she incurred for her treatment. The aggregate quantum of the bills and receipts tendered in evidence by the appellant is a sum of Rs. 2,69,920/- as rounded off to the nearest rupee.
14. In such circumstance, we are of the view that, the appellant has adequately established her claim for reimbursement of medical expenses for treatment for a sum of Rs. 2,69,920/-. The award impugned is modified to such extent.
15. So far as the claim on account of permanent disability is concerned, the Tribunal returned a finding that the extent of permanent partial disability suffered by the appellant was 25 per cent. No evidence was placed before us to suggest that such finding by the Tribunal was perverse.
16. Rekha Jain (supra) considered the plight of an actress. The appellant before us was engaged as a stenographer when she met with the accident.
17. Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) is of the view that, the question of ''total disablement'' as defined in Section 2 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 has to be viewed in the context as to whether the disablement incapacitated the person for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of accident or not. In the case before us, the appellant suffered injuries to her legs. She was working as a stenographer. The injury to her legs did not incapacitate her ability to discharge her work as a stenographer. This injury, at best, hinders her movement.
18. In Raj Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Their Lordships were of the following view in paragraph 13 thereof:
"13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors."
19. The Tribunal correctly applied the tests in determining the quantum of compensation on account of permanent disability. In such circumstances, we are unable to interfere with the award on the quantum awarded on this account.
20. F.M.A. No. 1927 of 2003 is allowed in part. The impugned award revised to the extent as indicated herein. There will be no order as to costs.
21. I agree.
