Phear, J.@mdashWe think that in this case the rule most be made absolute. The judgment of Mr. Craster in admitting the review is very short. He says (reads). It appears to me that the Judge has taken an erroneous view of the extent of his jurisdiction in this matter. If he were right, the consequence would be that, whereas in regular civil suits, in suits before the Collector''s Court under Act X of 1859, and in suits which are dependent upon the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the procedure for review is strictly laid down and limited in respect to the time and the cause, yet in a summary case like the present, the Court would be unrestricted in every way. It would not be obliged to confine its review to matter which was new since the former hearing, or to any of those points which are prescribed in the general Civil Procedure Code. The Judge might in fact on review hear an appeal from the decision of his predecessor upon precisely the same materials as those upon which his predecessor formed his judgment, and he might do this without any limit, as far as I see, with regard to time; and again his own decision upon review might be reviewed thereafter equally without limits as to time. The consequence would be that we should have here a perfectly unrestrained system of appeal upon appeal without any sort of limitation. And, indeed, as far as I understand the present case, the review which has been admitted is of the nature of an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Taylor. No doubt, every Court has be far the power to review its own decision as may be necessary for the purpose of making that decision in terms accord with the intention of the Court entertained at the time of passing it: for instance, to correct verbal errors, or otherwise to make the formal decree an accurate expression of the judgment which the Court intended to pass. But I am of opinion that an inferior Court of limited jurisdiction does not possess the general power of reviewing its own decision which the Judge appears, to think that every Court necessarily does possess. I may say that even the Court of Chancery in England, whose powers are as general as the powers of a Civil Court well can be, does not exercise the power of reviewing its own judgment except when error of law is apparent on the face of the judgment, or when new matter is brought to its notice which could not have been adduced before it at the time when the decree was made.1
2. On the whole then it seems to me as I have already said that the Zilliah Courts have not got the general power of reviewing their own judgments which would be necessary in order to support the exercise of jurisdiction which the Judge here has affected to make. It follows therefore that the admitting of the review was in this respect ultra vires, and the rule setting aside the order will be made absolute with costs.
1See perry v. Phelips, 17 Ves., 178 ; Mitford ---------and 811.
