C.P. Hobhouse, Bart, J.@mdashWe think, after the best consideration that we can give to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner for review, that there are only three points which call for any notice on our part: the first is whether there is any error or not in our not coming to a decision on the question of the collusiveness of certain decrees; the second is as regards the multifariousness of the suit; and the third is with reference to the decision of the 17th January 1868. I understand the learned counsel for the applicant for review to say that, if we had found that the decree of one Dilwar Hossein was a true decree, then we should have been obliged to find that, so fax as his client is concerned, the plaintiff had no cause of action. I really do not know whether this would have been the case or not; and in order to determine, first of all, whether the decree was a true or fictitious decree, and if it was a true decree, whether the plaintiff had any cause of action or not, it would, it seems to me, be necessary to go into the whole case again, re-consider the evidence in the case, and re-hear the counsel for the opposite party. Now, on turning to the judgment which we gave, I find that the pleaders who were then instructed by the defendants made one common issue on which they elected that we should determine, either for the plaintiff or for the defendants, and that issue is thus recorded.
2. I state in my judgment, after referring to certain admissions made, that "it is further not denied that, if the said Garib Hossein is found to be the person at present beneficially interested in those properties, and in the possession and enjoyment of them, then he, as the possessor, is bound to the extent of the properties to satisfy the decrees against Joki Chowdhry." So that it seems to me that the parties elected that we should determine the case on a question of fact, and that that question should be one altogether independent of that now raised before us. The parties were then at liberty to raise the question which the learned counsel now contends for; and if they did not do so, they have only themselves and their advisers to thank for it; and in my judgment, an application for review is not the proper place where we can come to a trial and determination of a question which was not raised in the appeal provided for by the law, and which requires us to go into the whole evidence once again. For these reasons I do not think that we ought now to allow the parties to raise the question which the learned counsel would now raise.
3. In the matter of multifariousness, that is a question which was fully argued at the first heaving, and all that the learned counsel now asks us to do is that we should hear it once again. Possibly we should hear from him arguments, not those which were urged at that time, but certain others which he is prepared to advance on that particular question; but here again I agree with a number of the Judges of this Court who have held that an application for review is not the place where we should have a re-argument of what has been already argued. If that were so, the Legislature, instead of providing for review on the narrow grounds expressed in the law, would have provided that every case which has once been heard in the way provided by the law should be entitled to a second hearing.
4. In the matter of the decree of the 17th January 1868, I think we went too far when we said that it was no evidence at all against the plaintiff; but at the same time, I do not think that it is conclusive on the point which was in issue before us, and I am quite clear therefore that that decree, standing alone, should not induce us to alter our judgment on the facts found.
5. The other grounds which the learned counsel would take are, in my judgment (although the learned counsel does not think it to be so), determined by the decision which we have originally passed in the case.
6. I would reject this application with costs.
Bayley, J.
7. I quite concur with Mr. Justice Hobhouse who has delivered the judgment of the Court in this case.
8. As to the admission of new arguments, after a decision has been given in the case upon points, the very same as were previously put before the Court, I have already expressed my opinion in review No. 42, decided on the 6th July last by Mr. Justice Markby and myself Ante, p. 321.
9. In regard to the manner in which this case has been placed before us, I would state that the pleaders argued the case, as on the merits upon the one point only, viz., whether Garib Hossein Chowdhry was really the beneficial owner of the property in suit; and after carefully hearing the evidence, as it was read by counsel, and argued upon by the pleaders on both sides, we came to the conclusion of fact that Garib Hossein was such beneficial owner.
10. The point of multifariousness had been previously raised and disposed of, and cannot, I think, be re-argued on a new footing by a new counsel. I agree in rejecting this application with costs.
