S. Ravindra Bhat, J.@mdashThe petitioners are claiming quashing of the order dated 14.03.06 issued by the Additional Sessions Judge, charging them with having committed offences punishable u/s 3(1)(X) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereafter referred to as ''the Act''). Charges were framed pursuant to initiation of criminal proceedings through First Information Report (FIR) No. 68/02 lodged on 15.06.05.
2. The first petitioner is the husband of the second petitioner and the father of the third petitioner. He and other petitioners reside on the first floor of premises being M-39, Greater Kailash-II. He had complained to the local police on 09.11.04 alleging that the basement and the ground floor were being used for commercial activities, in contravention of the Master Plan and other relevant laws, by one M/s Softtalk Technologies Pvt. Ltd., a sole proprietorship firm of one Shri Umesh Gupta. The complaint also alleged harassment by the said Shri Umesh Gupta and his employees. It is alleged that the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) was also notified about such illegal activities around the same time.
3. It is alleged in the present proceedings that after becoming aware of the complaints, the said occupant held out threats alleging that he would implicate all the petitioners. It is claimed that the first petitioner wrote letters to the Deputy Commissioner of Police. When matters stood thus, the police authorities, on 27.01.05 recorded information of breach of peace, u/s 107/111, Cr.P.C. against the petitioners, the complainant/informant in this case and the said Shri Umesh Gupta, which was accepted by the Special Executive Magistrate on 18.02.05. Thereafter, apparently a writ petition being WP (Crl.) 253/05 was initiated for a direction to lodge a First Information Report against the petitioners for alleged commission of offences under the Act. Notice was issued but subsequently on 17.05.05, it was disclosed that FIR No. 124/05 was lodged on allegations of violation of provisions of the act.
4. The FIR lodged at the instance of Vinod Kumar, son of Shri Ram Singh Nagar, who had alleged that the petitioners misbehaved with him on 10.12.04, reads as follows:
I Vinod Nagar S/o Shri Ram Singh Nagar R/o A-113, Dakshin Puri, New Delhi and work with Shri Umesh Gupta at M-39 Ground floor G.K. II as driver since last one year. I belong to Khatik caste. I usually stand near the Car which is parked at the gate. Smt. Simaran Kaur and her daughter (whose name I do not know but I can identify her) whenever cross near by since last 15-20 days speak that I am a chuda-chamar and whenever they come I should not come in the way. It hurts my emotion and when I tried to tell this to her husband Shri Sarwan Singh he also said that you ar actually a chuda-chamar and hence they are not saying anything wrong. When I told happening to may employer Shri Umesh Gupta and he talked to Sardar Sarwan Singh and on this Sarwan Singh misbehaved and said that he will not let we people stay there. I also came to know that Sarwan Singh has filed a court case against my employer Shri Umesh Gupta. I did not complain earlier because this man may stop saying these words to me about today on 10.12.04 around 8.45 a.m. in the morning when I case to duties to the house of Shri Umesh Gupta Ji. I took the keys and started cleaning the vehicle. At that time both mother and daughter throw dirty water on me and said that chuda-chamar why did you come and Simran Kaur said that at this time when here daughter goes to office Therefore putting this water on me they were making me to take bath. I have become tense due to this act of their and I feel that I should quit this job but I belong to a poor family and job is my compulsion. Even finding another job is not so easy. When the water was thrown on me at that guard Albis and Dhan Singh driver were also present. It is Therefore requested that you should take an appropriate action against the above mentioned persons. I shall be thankful to you.
5. Arguments were apparently heard on framing of charges on 06.02.05, when the Court recorded that counsel for the accused conceded that the charges could be framed. Later applications were filed stating that the concession was erroneously recorded and had not been actually made. The Additional Sessions Judge heard the matter on 14.03.06, and formed the opinion that prima facie a case u/s 3(1)(x) had been made out and, Therefore, framed the charges on that day.
6. It is contended that the background of the entire case and even the allegations made against the petitioners in the FIR nowhere make out a case for drawing up of charge. Mr. Sanjeev Narula, learned Counsel urged that the allegations were motivated because the complainant is an employee of Shri Umesh Gupta who had held out a threat to settle scores with the petitioners for having complained against his carrying on commercial/ business activity in the basement and ground floor of the premises. It was contended that the allegations of misuse led to some friction and the said Shri Gupta and his employees caused disturbance which resulted in initiation of proceedings u/s 107/111 Cr.P.C. If the entire matter were viewed from this perspective, the lodging of the FIR was motivated with malice and at the behest of the said Shri Gupta who had dominance and control over the complainant.
7. Learned Counsel urged by placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in
8. Learned Counsel further submitted that even otherwise the basic ingredients of the offences were not made out because the petitioners were unaware of the caste of the complainant and the words uttered were not with the intention to humiliate and insult him. It was submitted that merely calling a person by caste would not attract the provisions of the Act and there must be a specific allegation alleged against each of the accused. He placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in
9. Counsel for the respondent refuted the submissions and the allegations made on behalf of the petitioners. It was stated that the FIR contained clear allegations of the petitioners having committed the offences. It was submitted that as to whether the words were uttered in public view or within private property was a matter of trial and that prima facie the statement of the complainant disclosed that he used to stand at the gate. Therefore, the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners were inappropriate. It was also contended that the complainant had no commercial dealings with the petitioner nor was he in any manner linked with the petitioners. As far as the question of enmity or motive is concerned, counsel urged that even if it were assumed that the petitioners and Shri Gupta his employer, had some previous bad relationship, no such enmity could be attributed to the complainant in that regard.
10. Counsel also submitted that having regard to the overall circumstances of the case, and particularly, when the charges have been framed after hearing counsel, as well as keeping in mind the objects of the enactment, this Court ought not to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and quash the criminal proceedings as all the facts were yet to be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge.
11. The relevant part of the Act reads as follows:
3. Punishments for offences of atrocities-
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe- (i) to (ix) xxxxxxxxxx (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view:
12. In
13. This court in
14. In this case, the FIR records that the complainant usually stood near the Car, parked at the gate of the premises. Whenever the second and third petitioner crossed him, since 15-20 days prior to the complaint they used to say that he was a ``chuda-chamar''`; whenever they neared him, he had to go away. This behavior hurt his emotion and when tried to tell this to the first petitioner, he said that they did not say anything wrong. The complainant also mentions of another incident on 10.12.04 at 8.45 a.m. in the morning when he was cleaning a vehicle, the second and third petitioner allegedly threw dirty water on him and said that chuda-chamar why did you come. According to him, when the water was thrown on him, a guard Albis, and Dhan Singh, a driver were also present at the site.
15. I have given my anxious consideration to the facts of the case. The version of the petitioner is quite probable; there is no doubt that the third petitioner is an unmarried young woman, and asking her to stand trial would cause anguish, to her and the parents. It is also true that the complainant''s employer had some disputes with the first petitioner. The question is whether these circumstances are sufficient to stifle and quash the criminal proceedings. Daya Bhatnagar is no doubt an authority as to what constitutes ``public view''`. Yet, there cannot be a blind application of the ratio in that case. Here, the complainant had alleged repeated harassment by the petitioners. As to whether it was in public view or not is a matter of evidence; it cannot, in my opinion, be inferred at this stage that the alleged occurrence took place in private property; the complainant alleges that it took place when he was at the gate ( of the premises) and in view of two other persons, viz a guard and another driver. There is nothing on record suggestive of his commercial, or family relationship with them; indeed it is unknown whether they or any of them work for his employer. Besides, the expression used is, significantly enough, ``public view''` and not ``public place''`. In order to attract the offence, the act should have been done by accused in any place within the public view and it is not necessary that such place should be a public place. It can be even in a place which is not a public place, but which would be within the public view. Parliament evidently kept this significant distinction in mind.
16. So far as the means read aspect is concerned, whether the petitioners indeed said the offending words, with intention to humiliate, the surrounding circumstances, the animus and bad blood of the complainant''s employer, are matters of evidence. It might well be as the petitioner''s say, i.e that the complainant is motivated by reason of the dispute with the complainant''s employer; equally, it might be possible that the offending words were uttered, after the disputes arose. Similarly, the acts complained of are not only the words and caste description, but other activities, which might well amount to the offence. There can be no thumb rule, in my opinion that describing a person or calling him by his caste would never amount to humiliation; the object of the enactment has to be seen by the court, while appreciating the evidence. In a given case, the manner in which the caste of a person is described, the tone used, and other material circumstances, might indicate the intention to humiliate. At this stage, when charges have been framed, after consideration of the materials, it would be inappropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction u/s 482 and quash the criminal proceedings.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petitioners are disentitled to relief. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
