1. Heard Shri R. R. Vyas, Shri J. B. Kasat and Shri Laique Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri M. K. Pathan, learned Additional
Public Prosecutor for respondents.
2. These matters have been placed before us upon a reference made by the learned brother Judges for answering two questions formulated in the
referal order dated 5th February, 2018.
3. Facts, at their bare minimum, are as under :Â
A] The petitioners have been externed by respondent No.1, Deputy Commissioner of Police, ZoneÂ1, Nagpur City, Nagpur, from the area of Nagpur
city for different periods subject to maximum of two years. The power invoked by respondent No.1 is under Section 56(1)(a)and(b) of the
Maharashtra Police Act (in short, “Act 1951â€). Clause (a) of Section 56(1) requires that the movements or activities of a person are causing
alarm, danger or harm to the person and property. Clause (b) of the Section comes into play if the authority empowered under the Act 1951 acting
reasonably believes that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of offences enumerated in this clause and is also of the
opinion that the witnesses for fear of reprisal are unwilling to give evidence in public against such person.
B] During the course of hearing of the petition before the Division Bench it was argued that the impugned order was illegal, irrational and arbitrary it
being excessive, showing no application of mind and little respect for the principle of audi altaram partem.
C] The Division Bench bearing in its mind the object of this provision of law, the law crytalized over the years as a result of landmark decisions of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Pandharinath Shridhar Ragnekar v. Dy Commr. Of Police, The State of Maharashtra reported in (1973) 1
SCC 372; State of NCT of Delhi & anr v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 102,5 Tata Celluular v. Union of India reported in 1994
AIR SCW 3344, Lt Governor, NCT & ors v. Ved Prakash @ Vedu reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2645 and Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay
& anr reported in AIR 1952 SC 221 held that though the decision or action of externment can always be challenged on the ground that it is vitiated by
arbitrariness or unfairness or illegality or irrationality all together converging into the famous Wednesbury principle, there are well defined limits to the
power of judicial review that a writ Court can exercise over such an order passed as a part of administrative functions of the authority.
D] The Division Bench found that the object of externment being to restrain a person from indulging in or continuing with his illegal activities for a
certain period of time, it was necessary that the movements of such a person are restricted to such an area as would make it possible for authorities to
keep a watch over his activities and if this is to be done effectively, the removal of such a person could possibly and reasonably be from a larger or
additional area. The Division Bench held that the legislature itself had taken note of the improved or common means of transport and communication
system reducing the impact of externment order and enabling the externee to easily flout the externment order and that is the reason why not only the
Hon'ble Apex Court but also the legislature through amendment made to Section 56 by Maharashtra Act 33 of 1981 made a provision for authorizing
the officer to extern a person even outside his area of illegal activities or the jurisdiction of the officer and such larger area need not be contigious to
the actual area of his illegal activities. The Division Bench took the view that the order of externment from the larger or additional area can be justified
on the basis of existence of material showing the nature of activities of the externee in a restricted area and it cannot be vitiated merely because no
specific reference is made to the options available to deal with the situation. It also held that there could not be any insistence upon the existence of
material to show that the larger or additional area so chosen or selected is intimately connected with the actual area of the activities of the externee
due to improved or common means of transport and communication.
E] During the course of hearing, a further question arose as to whether or not details of the material allegations need be furnished to the person
proposed to be externed. The Division Bench, again referring to the cases decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court and this High Court found that what is
required to be furnished to the proposed externee, as required under Section 59 of the Act 1951, is only general nature of material allegations and
nothing more.
F] The Division Bench, however, having been confronted with some divergent views expressed in some of the Judgments rendered by the other
coordinate Benches, such as in the cases of Pappu Mishra vs. Union of India, 2017 ALL MR (Cri.) 1, Sanjay Ruptakke vs. State, 2017 ALL MR
(Cri.) 3983, Sayyad Jafar vs. Divisional Commissioner, 2017 ALL MR (Cri.) 4303 found itself in a dilemma and, therefore, formulating two questions
for their answer by a larger Bench, passed the referral order. The questions framed are thus :
(1) Where the activities of externee are confined to specific area of the local limits of the jurisdiction of a police station in a district but the order of
externment extends to the entire district, rural areas and even beyond the district or districts (irrespective of the fact that it is contiguous or not)
wheether such an order needs to show the existence of material â€" (a) that a larger or additional area so chosen or selected is intimately connected
with the actual area of the activities of the externee due to improved or common means of transport and communication system, (b) that the facts or
the material warranting externment from a larger or additional area or neighbouring area exist, and (c) that the externing authority has applied its mind
to the factors (a) and (b) while passing an order of externment?
(2) Whether it is necessary to state in the show cause notice the details of inÂcamera statements recorded by the externing authority to reach to the
satisfaction that the witnesses are not coming forward to give evidence or depose in public against the proposed externee due to fear of alarm, danger
or harm to their person or property?
4. We have heard Shri Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No.1002/2017, Shri Kasat, learned counsel for the petitioner in
Criminal Writ Petition No.1249/2017, Shri Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No.1006/2017 and Shri Mehroz Pathan,
learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent State. We have gone through the provisions made under Sections 56 and 59 of the Act 1951
being relevant for consideration of the points raised by the questions referred to us and made an endeavour to find out the answers as reasonably as
we could.
5. It is the contention of Shri Vyas and Shri Kasat, learned counsel for the two petitioners that it being the settled law that an order passed in exercise
of the executive authority of the State can be challenged on the ground of it being unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or procedurally improper, the order
which puts a restrain upon the fundamental right of freedom of movement guaranteed to a citizen of India must clear the hurdle of trinity comprising
illegality, reasonableness and procedural propriety entrenched as Wednusbury test. They further submit that it is for this reason that the order of
externment removing a person not only from the actual area of his illegal activities but also from a larger area, even beyond the limits of jurisdiction of
the authority must show existence of material warranting such larger externment. They further submit that the order must also reflect consideration by
the authority of material available on record or application of mind by the authority to the existing material. They further submit that even though, the
amended provision of Section 56 of the Act, 1951 confers the power upon the officer to direct removal of a person from an area bigger than the
domain of his unlawful activities, the power must be exercised in a reasonable manner or otherwise it would agitate against the doctrine of
Wednusbury consistently followed by Courts in India. They also submit that existence of such material must be seen either from the facts present on
record which show that the suburban areas or satellite towns of big city which are, by reason of improved means of transport and communication, are
intimately connected with the actual area of operation of the externee or the special facts available on record showing that if an expansive order of
externment is not passed, the very object of externing the person would be difficult to reach. They further submit that the externment order must also
show application of mind of the authority to such facts or special facts.
6. Learned counsel would further submit that for the very reason of the need for being reasonable, fair and proper, the show cause notice issued under
Section 59 of the Act 1951 must give details of inÂcamera statements recorded by the officer to reach the satisfaction that the witnesses are unwilling
to come out in public and give evidence against the externee for the fear of causing of harm to the life or property of the persons. They submit that if
such details are not given, the person would be deprived of an effective opportunity of hearing before an adverse order is passed against him and that
would frustrate the very object of issuance of prior notice.
7. Shri Trivedi, learned counsel for the third petitioner has, adopting the argument of Shri Vyas and Shri Kasat, learned counsel, argued on the lines
drawn by the latter. In addition, he submits that the show cause notice must also mention the date and place of incident which has given rise to the
envisaged apprehension in the mind of the witnesses.
8. Shri Pathan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the law has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its leading cases and,
therefore, it is no longer res integra on the question as to whether or not the order issued under Section 56(1)(a) and/or (b) must also show that there
exists some material which indicates that there is a need for externing a person from larger areas. He further submits that the settled law would show
that there is no need for the authority to make a reference to those facts or the material in the order itself as would warrant externment from a larger
area. He further submits that what is required to be informed to the proposed externee under Section 59 of the Act 1951 is the general nature of
material allegations made against him and, therefore, neither any details of inÂcamera statements recorded by the officer to satisfy himself that the
witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence or depose in public against the externee due to fear of alarm, danger or harm to their person
or property be stated nor is there any need to make a mention of in camera statements in the order. The leading cases Shri Pathan speaks of are of
Pandharinath, Sanjeev @ Bitto and Ved Prakash @ Vedu (supra).
9. The first question is about the need for an externment order being reflective of the existence of material on record justifying externment from a
larger area much beyond the actual area of the illegal activities of a person and the externing authority being conscious of such material and being
convinced at least subjectively about the necessity of banishing a person to a distant area.
10. Previously, there was no express power conferred upon the externing authority to direct removal of a person from an expansive area so as to
make implementation of the order of externment much effective, easier and convenient. Even then, the law settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court
favoured such spacious externment in some cases with a view to facilitate the effective implementation of the order of externment. In the case of
Pandharinath (supra), one of the challenges involved was based on the ground that the order of externment was excessive and unreasonable. The
Hon'ble Apex Court held that an excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on personal liberty than is reasonable
in the circumstances of the case can be permitted. But, it also found that there could be cases and cases where inclusion of a bigger area for
externment could be justified. Further holding that no general formulation could be made about the proposition that the order of externment must
always be restricted to the area to which the illegal activities extend, it further observed in paragraph 15, “............. A larger area may conceivably
have to be comprised within the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings.†It held that with the rise in industrialization and
urbanization simultaneously witnessing improvement in the means of transportation and communication, the surrounding areas of industrial towns and
urban centres have got themselves intimately connected with such industrial towns and urban cities thereby facilitating hassleÂfree movement of
persons. It also found that a fair proportion of the multitudinous populace streaming in and out of such big cities in the pursuit of their daily avocations
is a factor relevant that must be borne in mind by Courts. It observed that an order of externment restricted to a particular area chosen by the
externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof would, therefore, in such circumstances fail of its true purpose. The Hon'ble Apex
Court observed that it would be impossible to secure obedience to an order extending to field of illegal activities only at least in such cases and its
enforcement would raise practical problems which would impair the efficacy of the order. In doing so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld similar view
taken by different Division Benches of this Court. These cases were Â
(1) Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968, decided on 17th March 1968.
(2) Criminal Applications No. 30 and 93 of 1970, decided on 23rd February 1970 and
(3) Criminal Application No. 149 of 1972, decided on 3rd March 1972.
11. So, the power of the officer to extern a person from a much larger area than the area to which his illegal activities are confined, has always been
seen by the courts to be implicitly present in the power of the authority to extern a person under Section 56 of the Act, 1951. These judicial
pronouncements got the legislative sanction when in the year 1981, by the Maharashtra Act 33 of 1981, an amendment was introduced to Section 56
(1). This amended provision conferred power upon the officer to extern a person from an area larger than the area of his actual activities
notwithstanding the fact that the larger area is beyond local limits of the jurisdiction of the officer and/or not even contiguous. However, while doing
so, the authority, as per the amendment, is required to indicate the route by which and the time within which the person directed shall remove himself
from the area prohibited for him to be in for the time being.
12. The amended provision, however, lays down no guidelines as to how the discretion so conferred upon the officer be exercised by him. It does not
say anything about the existence or otherwise of the material on record to justify an order made for a commodious space. It also does not indicate any
criteria on which such an excessive order could be justifiably passed by the officer. These deficiencies have given rise to what could be called as
conflict of opinion amongst the superior courts. It would be necessary for us, therefore, to once again refer to the case of Pandharinath (supra) and
also to the subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in an endeavour to resolve the conflict of opinion.
13. In Pandharinath, Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered contiguity of suburban areas to the areas of a bigger city, villages adjoining to a big city
and satellite towns of the industrial areas, as a factor relevant for passing spacious externment order. This would definitely show that in such cases,
there may not be any direct material present on record to justify the externment order made for larger area. But, it can be further understood, that if
the facts of a case show that the actual area of the illegal activities of the externee fall in such a city as having suburbs or such immediate outskirts or
such adjoining towns as would enable a Court to take judicial notice of they having been intimately connected with the area of the illegal activities or
its surroundings, the order of externment could not be found to be falling foul of Wednesbury reasonableness. In other words there could be facts and
circumstances present on record of the case which are so prominent as would emphatically indicate that externment of a person from a small area
would be futile unless a bigger area is included therein because of the intimate connection between the area of illegal activities and adjoining greater
areas. In such a case the proposed externee, in order to remove him from his moorings, could be justifiably relegated to suffer the restriction of his
movement from a larger area, and if this is done, it would lend purpose to and prevent frustration of the externment order.
14. At the same time, as held in Pandharinath (supra), general formulation for passing or not passing what is called an excessive order, cannot be
made and it all depends upon the data collected by the authority. Such data, as could be further understood from the said case could bring to light some
relevant factors such as the character of the proposed externee, the habits formed by him, the actual area of his illegal activities, the nature of
surrounding area, the impact of the illegal activities and their extent and intensity, the capacity of the proposed externee and so on and so forth. Then,
in order to scrutinize the subjective satisfaction of the externing authority, with a view to find out it's any connection with objective criterion, the law
which has now been crystalised by several decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, would show that what can at the most be gone into by the High
Court as a Court of secondary review, would only be the question of existence of the material and not of sufficiency or otherwise of the material. If
some material is seen to be present on record, the scrutiny of the High Court would not go further so as to even examine the adequacy or otherwise of
the material for reaching the subjective satisfaction of the authority. In paragraph 15 of Pandharinath (supra) judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has removed all the doubts whatever they have been in this regard when it held that it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the
externment order can be made effective, for how long, should it last, within what time frame subject to the statutory limit of two years should it
operate and to what territories within the statutory limitations of Section 56 should it extend so as to subserve its real purpose. These principles have
only been reinforced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its further judicial pronouncements in the cases of Sanjeev alias Bittoo and Ved Prakash @
Vedu (supra).
15. In the case of Sanjeev alias Bittoo, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle that it is only the existence of material and not sufficiency
of material which can be questioned as the satisfaction is primarily subjective, somewhat similar to the one required to be arrived at by the detaining
authority under the preventive detention laws, the scope of judicial review of an administrative order being limited only to the legality of the decisionÂ‐
making process and not legality of the order per se. In Ved Prakash @ Vedu also the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a similar view holding that the
satisfaction of the authority although primarily subjective, should be based on objectivity, but sufficiency of material as such may not be gone into by a
writ court. The only exception made by the Hon'ble Apex Court is that when the impugned order fails to take into consideration the relevant facts or is
based upon irrelevant factors and in such a case, it is held, an interference with the externment order could and must be made. But, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also sounded a warning against uncalled for intrusion when it said that mere possibility of another view may not be a ground for
declaring an administrative action invalid. Of course, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also made an allowance for interference in case of an order
shown to be actuated by malice.
16. What we have said thus far, in our attempt to cull out the principles, is only a summary of various observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court made in
it's aforeÂstated cases and we think that we would be more profited if we refer to these observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in these leading
cases, which to our mind are relevant.
17. In Pandharinath (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus Â
“16. An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restrain on proposal liberty can be permitted than is reasonable in the
circumstances of the case. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe v. The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur (supra), is an
instance in point where an externment order was set aside on the ground that it was far wider than was justified by the exigencies of the case. The
activities of the externee therein were confined to the city of Pandharpur and yet the externment order covered an area as extensive as districts of
Sholapur, Satara and Poona. These areas are far widely removed from the locality in which the externee had committed but two supposedly illegal
acts. The exercise of the power was therefore arbitrary and excessive, the order having been passed without referene to the purpose of the
externment.
17. But Balu Shivling's case (supra), furnishes no analogy in the instant matter. A vast city like Bombay presents its own peculiar problems of law and
order. It has an overÂgrowing industrial complex and the city has spread its arms far and wide. A fair proportion of its teeming population is mobile,
with large multitudes streaming in and out of the city in the pursuit of their daily avocations. An order of externment restricted to the particular area
chosen by the externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof would in such circumstances fail of its true purpose. It would be
impossible to secure obedience to such an order and its enforcement would raise practical problems which would impair the efficacy of the order. An
order in the instant case if restricted, say, to the areas within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle Police Station and its periphery would not serve its
purpose. Rather than solving a problem of law and order, it would create yet one more.
18. That is why, on similar facts, the Bombay High Court has consistently repelled challenges made to externment orders on the ground that they
extended not only to the district of Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana as well. In Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968 of a Division Bench
(Kotval, C. J., and Kamat, J.) observed in their judgment of March 17, 1968:
“In the present case the area of activity of the externee was undoubtedly stated to be Santacruz, but Santacruz is a fairly wide area. Moreover, it is
very intimately connected with the surrounding area of Thana district. It is common knowledge that Thana town in the surrounding area is also an area
where large industries have grown contiguous with the industrial area of Greater Bombay and that the entire industrial area is connected together by
several means of communication including suburban trains of which there are several during each day, by taxis plying to and from Greater Bombay
and by bus services operating between Greater Bombay and several parts of Thana Distict. Therefore, the Police could reasonably have thought that
it would not be sufficient to ask the petitioner to keep off only from the area of Greater Bombay which has an equally busy and highly industrialised
area contiguous to it. Therefore, the order was extended to Thana District.â€
18. In Sanjeev alias Bittoo (supra), referring to the principle of Pandharinath (supra) that it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best
the order can be made effective so as to serve its real purpose, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 14 thus :
“14. As regards the period, it was held that it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the order can be made effective, so as to
subserve its real purpose. How long within the statutory limit of two years fixed by Section 58, the order shall operate and to what territories within the
statutory limitations of Section 58 it should extend are matters which must depend upon its decision on the nature of the data which the authority is
able to collect in the externment proceedings.
No general formulation can be made that the order of externment must always be restricted to the area of the illegal activities of the externee. There
can be no doubt that the executive order has also to show when questioned that there was application of mind. It is the existence of material and not
the sufficiency of material which can be questioned as the satisfaction is primarily subjective somewhat similar to one required to be arrived at by the
detaining authority under the preventive detention laws. The scope of judicial review of administrative orders is rather limited. The consideration is
limited to the legality of decision making process and not legality of the order per se. Mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for
interference.
19. These principles of law to be followed by the courts in undertaking a judicial review of the action of externment of a person, as we gather, have
been moulded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the anvil of Wednesbury doctrine. This is seen from its observations in paragraphs 19 and 20,
reproduced thus :
“19. Before summarising the substance of the principles laid down therein we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of Lord Greene in
Associated Provinicial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (KB at p. 229 : ALL ER pp. 682 HÂ683 A). It reads as follows:
“... It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to
exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used
as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself
properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which
are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly,
there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. … In another, it taking into
consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into
one another.â€
Lord Greene also observed (KB p. 230: All ER p. 683 FÂG)
“... it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what
the court considers unreasonable. … The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over
another.â€
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, to arrive at a decision on “reasonableness†the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into
account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person
could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many
choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not fore the court to substitute its view.
20. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarised in 1985 by Lord Diplock in CCSU case as illegality, procedural
impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle
followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock observed in that case as follows: (All ER p. 950hÂj)
“Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come
about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first
ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a caseÂ‐
byÂcase basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of
'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;â€
Lord Diplock explained “irrationality†as follows: (All ER p. 951 aÂb)
“By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesubry unreasonableness'. It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its definance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it.â€
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further emphasized upon the manner in which these principles be put into effect while examining correctness or
otherwise of the externment order. We would get the enlightenment in this regard from paragraphs 24 and 25 of the said judgment reproduced thus :
“24. It is true that some material must exist but what is required is not an elaborate decision akin to a judgment. On the contrary the order directing
externment should show existence of some material warranting an order of externment. While dealing with the question mere repetition of the
provision would not be sufficient. Reference is to be made to some material on record and if that is done, the requirements of law are met. As noted
above, it is not the sufficiency of material but the existence of material which is sine qua non.
25. As observed in Gazi Saduddin case satisfaction of the authority can be interferred with if the satisfaction recorded is demonstratively perverse
based on no evidence, misreading of evidence or which a reasonable man could not form or that the person concerned was not given due opportunity
resulting in prejudice. To that extent, objectivity is inbuilt in the subjective satisfaction of the authority.
21. These principles came to be reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of Ved Prakash @ Vedu (supra). The
observations made in paragraph 21, being relevant, are reproduced thus Â
“21. An order of externment must always be restricted to the area of illegal activities of the externee. The executive order must demonstrate due
application of mined on the part of statutory authority. When the validity of an order is questioned, what would be seen is the material on which the
satisfaction of the authority is based. The satisfaction of the authority although primarily subjective, should be based on objectivity. But sufficiency of
material as such may not be gone into by the writ court unless it is found that in passing the impugned order the authority has failed to take into
consideration the relevant facts or had based its decision on irrelevant factors not germane therefor. Mere possibility of another view may not be a
ground for interference. It is not a case where malice was alleged against the third appellant.
22. The opening line of the aboveÂreferred paragraph, of course, prescribes that an order of externment must always be restricted to the area of
illegal activities of the externee. The observation has to be understood in the light of the observations made in other paragraphs of the judgment and
the principles of law that this case reaffirms. Referring to various cases previously decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in particular, the case of
Pandharinath (supra), Gazi Saduddin v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2003 SCC (Cri) 1637 and Sanjeev @ Bittoo (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that primarily the satisfaction has to be of the authority passing the order and it should be based on the material on record and that
interference with the order can be made only if it is either demonstratively perverse based on no evidence or passed as a result of misreading of the
evidence or is illogical or has been arrived at without giving due opportunity of hearing, resulting in causing of prejudice to the person against whom the
order is passed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, as we have seen from the observations made in paragraph 21, has emphatically stated that sufficiency
of material as such may not be gone into by the writ court unless it is found that while passing the order, the authority has failed to take into
consideration the relevant facts or considered irrelevant facts and made it clear that mere possibility of another view can never be a reason for making
interference though malice could be one such reason.
23. The cases of Pandharinath and Sanjeev @ Bittoo (supra) have also shown to us that an externment order can be made not only for the actual area
of the illegal activities of the externee, but also for a much larger area, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. These cases, in
particular, the case of Pandharinath give a reasonable hint that there could be some facts present on record of which judicial notice can be taken, as
for example, a surrounding area being contiguous and so intimately connected with the actual area of operation of the externee that it is impossible to
effectively remove the externee from the area in which he carries on his illegal activities, thereby giving birth to a need for passing of a spacious order
so as to include much more area than ordinarily would have been. There could be, however, some other cases wherein the facts and circumstances
present on record may not be of such a nature as to enable the authority to draw an inference or form an opinion regarding the contiguity of areas or
interÂconnection between them necessitating externment from a bigger area and it is in such cases that it would be necessary that some more
material is present on record to enable the authority to reach a subjective satisfaction justifying a more generous order. But, even in such cases, as has
been consistently held in the cases of Pandharinath and Sanjeev @ Bittoo and even Gazi Saduddin (supra) that it is only the existence of the material
and not its sufficiency which could be gone into for testing the externment order for its validity or otherwise. In Sanjeev @ Britto, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also held that the externment order should show existence of some material justifying the order. But, such reflection in the order, it is
further clarified, need not be akin to that of a reasoned order and it is enough that reference is made to some material on record and if that is done, the
requirements of law are met. These principles of law are further explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court by noting that it is a matter of legitimate
inference that the authority while considering the material to adjudicate upon the question of need for externment, also considered the options available
to it and adopted one of them and that there could not be any “hairÂsplitting in such mattersâ€. These observations appearing in paragraph 26 of
the judgment in Sanjeev @ Bitto are reproduced thus Â
“26. The material justifying externment can also throw light on options to be extercised. If referring to the materials, the authority directing
externment also indicates the option it thinks to be proper and appropriate, it cannot be said to be vitiated even though there is no specific reference to
the other options. It is a matter of legitimate inference that when considering materials to adjudicate on the question of desirability for externment,
options are also considered and one of the three options can be adopted. There cannot be any hairÂsplitting in such matters. A little play in the joints is
certainly permissible while dealing with such matters.â€
24. A combined reading of the principles of law laid down in all the aforesaid cases would show that ordinarily the externment order be restricted to
the area of illegal activity of externee. In a given case, the order can be capacious which would include more area than the actual field of the illegal
activities of the externee so as to shake the externee off his roots and this may be so necessary in a particular case for achieving the object of
externment order. While making such an expansive order, sufficient leeway has been granted to the officer and it includes the power conferred under
amended provision of Section 56 of the Act, 1951 to remove a person from a much bigger area than the area of his actual activity and such a larger
area may not necessarily be contiguous to the area of illegal activities or may not be falling within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the officer. But,
this discretion is always subject to the limits drawn by the Wednesbury triad of unreasonableness, already elaborated upon in the previous paragraphs.
25. Thus, we can now reasonably say that although the officer is having the discretion to extern a person from a much larger area, the discretion is
neither unfettered nor uncanalized nor unrestricted. The discretion is rather guided by the sound principles of judicial review of administrative action or
statutory discretion which have now been called the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness. That would mean that an externment order must be
based upon some material, that it must refer to some material on record, and if that is done, the requirements of law are met and the judicial review
would go no further to examine sufficiency or otherwise of such material. In a given case, it may also happen that the externment order does not refer
to some material on record. Still, the externment order could be seen as unassailable. Such possibility would arise when the situation of surrounding
areas is such as to give rise to an impression upon taking of judicial notice of the situation that these areas are contiguous or adjacent to each other or
interÂconnected with each other through the improved means of transport and communication warranting externment of a person from a larger area
in order to sweep the person off his moorings, just to make the order of externment effective and practicable, as held in Pandharinath (supra). But,
some time the facts and circumstances may not be so selfÂspeaking and in such a case, no judicial notice could possibly be taken. It is in such a case,
there would be need for the externment order to refer to some material on record, though not eloquently, and if that is done, the externment order
would clear the validity test of Wednesbury doctrine. Once such reference to some material on record is seen, the judicial review has to stop as no
further enquiry into sufficiency or otherwise of the material to pass a spacious externment order is permissible. This is on account of the cardinal
principle of judicial review that when exercise of discretion is questioned as being arbitrary, a secondary reviewing Court, a High Court examining the
challenge on the ground of arbitrariness of administrative action or statutory discretion would be a secondary court of review unlike in a situation
where it considers the challenge based on grounds of inequality and discrimination when it turns into a primary court of review, cannot substitute it's
own view for the view taken by the authority whose decision is under review just because another view is possible, unless the view of the authority
subject to review is shown to be illegal or perverse or illogical or impossible, or procedurally improper. These are all nothing but part of Wednesbury
principle of unreasonableness.
26. The discussion made so far would lead us to record our conclusions as follows :
(i) The externment order directing externment of a person from a much larger area than the one of his illegal activities, must be based upon some
material which provides an objective criteria to the authority for reaching a subjective satisfaction regarding the need for externing a person to an
expansive area though it may not always directly or elaborately refer to that material in the order itself, as it all depends upon facts and circumstances
of the case which need be vetted through the judicial process of drawing of legitimate inference following the law of Pandharinath and Sanjeev @
Brittoo (supra).
(ii) The order of externment need not necessarily refer to the details of the material considered by it so as to show independently that larger or
additional area chosen by it is intimately connected with the actual area of the activities of the externee due to improved or common means of
transport and communication.
(iii) Application of mind to the material present on record by the authority passing the externment order is necessary, but any reflection of application
of mind in the externment order in a specific manner, as if to pass a reasoned order, would not be necessary. It would be enough if the order discloses
that the subjective satisfaction has been reached by considering the material available on record and it would and should be a matter of legitimate
inference that the authority, while considering materials to satisfy itself about the need for and extent of externment to be ordered, also considered all
the options available to it and selected in it's wisdom the one which it thought to be most appropriate. This would also mean that authority, in this way,
can select a larger area for being covered under it's externment order, as one of the options available to it, whether such larger area has within it
contiguous or interÂconnected or intimately connected pockets of areas or not. Question no. (1) having three aspects enumerated in clauses (a), (b)
and (c), is answered specifically through the three conclusions made as above.
27. Having answered question no. (1) in the above terms, we find that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pappu @
Akhilesh Shivshankar Mishra v. The State of Maharashtra & anr reported in 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 1 in terms that facts and factors looked into by the
authority for reaching the subjective satisfaction as envisaged under Section 56 (1) of the Act, 1951 must be capable of supporting the need for an
order of externment to be made beyond the area of jurisdiction of such authority and that the need for the same must be evaluated by that authority
and that this must be done through the process of application of mind to the material present on record which application of mind must surface in the
main order, cannot be said to be completely laying down a correct position of law. We have already made the conclusions in this regard and
accordingly answered the first question referred to us. We, therefore, hold that to the extent the view taken in Pappu Mishra (supra) is inconsistent
with the conclusions made by us, is not a good law and to that extent, it is overruled.
28. Now, we would take up the second question for it's resolution. Upon consideration of the provision of Section 59 of the Act, 1951 and the law
settled over a period of time by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject, we do not think that answer to the question is very difficult to come by.
The provision of law as well as its clarification given in different judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court do not leave any doubt about the answer
that must be given to the question. But, as the answer we must give, we begin the effort with relevant portion of Section 59 as contained in subÂ‐
section (1) reproduced here and it reads thus:
“59. Hearing to be given before order under sections 55, [56m 57 or 57A] is passed
(1) Before an order under section 55 [56, 57 or 57A] is passed against any person the officer acting under any of the said sections or any officer
above the rank of an Inspector authorised by that officer shall inform the person in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him
and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. If such person makes an application for the examination of any
witness produced by him, the authority or officer concerned shall grant such application; and examine such witness, unless for reasons to be recorded
in writing, the authority or officer is of opinion that such application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Any writtenÂstatement put in by
such person shall be filed with the record of the case. Such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer proceeding under this section by an
advocate or attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the witness produced by him.†(emphasis supplied).
29. A plain reading of the aboveÂreferred provision of law would indicate that what is required to be informed in writing is only the general nature of
the material allegations in order to give the person proposed to be externed a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding the
allegations. When it is said that the material allegations against the person be communicated to him generally or in a manner as to give an idea of the
general nature of material allegations, it necessarily means that the material allegations with all their details regarding the date, place and specific facts
of the incident must not be disclosed and only as much indication of these allegations be made in general terms as is sufficient to give notice to the
proposed externee about what he has to face and explain in the enquiry. Such information must contain in general terms the main allegations made
against the proposed externee and not all the details of the allegations. Such requirement of the notice to be given under Section 59 (1) of the Act,
1951 applies when the externment proceedings are initiated either under Section 55 or Section 56 or Section 57 or Section 57A of the Act, 1951. In all
these proceedings, the notice to be issued under Section 59 should contain as much of material allegations stated in general terms as would be
necessary for constituting a sufficient notice contemplated under Section 59 of the Act, 1951.
30. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the effective opportunity of hearing is the basic groove of the principle of rule of law on which
the stylus of our Constitutional philosophy plays the hymn of justice and, therefore, if the notice served upon the proposed externee under Section 59 is
so vague and devoid of essential particulars as to leave the proposed externee confused and confounded regarding the explanation that he should give,
the notice would be arbitrary and the whole action taken following the notice, would be arbitrary. It is submitted that such notice denying the proposed
externee of his right of reasonable hearing would be no notice in the eye of law. This has been disagreed to by Shri M. K. Pathan, learned Additional
Public Prosecutor appearing for the State contending that nature and reasonableness of the limited notice required to be given under Section 59 has
already been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its cases discussed earlier and has been explained by it and, therefore the argument deserves
outright rejection.
31. Although there can be no doubt about the essentiality of adequacy of showÂcause notice as a part of principle of effective hearing to be given to
an affected person, the rule, we must say, assumes different forms and shapes exhibiting different contours and limits, in it's application to myriads of
fact situations as well as legal settings. The concept of sufficiency of notice for it's comprehension does not depend only on the form of notice but
also, rather more, on the nature of discretion or power conferred upon the authority, the object underlying the discretion or the power, the limits
prescribed thereon by the legislature and the attending facts and circumstances of the case. It is the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in it's
various judgments which now has given us the benefit of having with us a clear exposition of the idea of sufficient notice contemplated in Section 59
of the Act, 1951, which indicates that the discretion and duty of the authority are both guided by law, an attribute fundamental to system directed by
rule of law.
32. It would be useful for us here to refer to what Hon'ble Apex Court said in the case of S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India reported in 1967 AIR
(SC) 1427, decided by the Constitution Bench. It emphasized that in a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive
authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. It is further held that the rule of law from this point of view means, the decisions should be
made by the application of known principles and rules and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is.
The Hon'ble Apex Court quoted with approval Lord Mansfield's classic analysis of the principle of rule of law in the case of John Wilkes (1770) 4
Burr 2528 at p. 2539 thus  “means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fancifulâ€.
33. As stated earlier, the body of principles governing the nature of notice that must be given under Section 59 is already developed and this area no
longer remains a field either overrun by doubts or freed of fetters and shackles.
34. In Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay & anr reported in AIR 1952, SC 221, another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court repelling the
challenge to the validity of the procedure prescribed for externing a person under Section 27 (1) of the Bombay Police Act (4 of 1902), which was in
substance no different from Section 56 of the Act, 1951, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the law was extraordinary in its nature and has been
made only to meet those exceptional cases where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against
certain bad characters whose presence in certain areas constitutes a menace to the society or the public residing therein. With such purpose of the
Bombay Police Act, 1902, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that if the proposed externee is to be given a right to confront or crossÂexamine the
witnesses, the object of the Act would be wholly defeated.
Upon such reasoning, the Hon'ble Apex Court upheld that the validity of Section 27 of the Bombay Police Act. The relevant observations of the
Hon'ble Apex Court appearing in paragraph 7 are reproduced for the sake of ready reference as under:
“7......As regards the procedure to be followed in such cases. S. 27(4) of the Act lays down that before an order of externment is passed against
any person; the Commissioner of Police or any officer authorized by him shall inform such person, in writing, of the general nature of the material
allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of explaining these allegations. He is permitted to appear through an Advocate, or an
Attorney and can file a written statement and examine witnesses for the purpose of clearing his character. The only point which Mr. Umrigar
attempts to make in regard to the reasonableness of this procedure is that the suspected person is not allowed to crossÂexamine the witnesses who
deposed against him and on whose evidence the proceedings were started. In our opinion, this by itself would not make the procedure unreasonable
having regard to the avowed intention of the legislature in making the enactment. The law is certainly an extraordinary one and has been made only to
meet those exceptional cases where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad
characters whose presence in certain areas constitute a menace to the safety of the public residing therein. This object would be wholly defeated if a
right to confront or crossÂexamine these witnesses was given to the suspect. The power to initiate proceedings under the Act has been vested in a
very high and responsible officer and he is expected to act with caution and impartiality while discharging his duties under the Act. This contention of
Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail.â€
35. The aboveÂreferred observations, we think, provide clear insight into the concept of notice that may be given under Section 59. It should
effectively perform a balancing act. In other words, it must be of such nature as would be a sufficient compliance with rule of adequate prior hearing
on the one hand and would not disclose the identity of the witnesses so as to expose the witnesses to some danger or harm to them or their property
thereby defeating the very object of the proposed action, on the other.
36. In subsequent case of Pandharinath (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically dealt with the question about the nature of notice required to
be given under Section 59 (1) of the Act, 1951. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such notice need not give any full and complete disclosures of
particulars in a way as would be required in the open prosecution. It further held that if the showÂcause notice were to furnish to the proposed
externee concrete data like specific dates of incidents or the names of persons involved in those incidents, it would be easy enough to fix the identity
of those who out of fear of injury to their person or property are unwilling to depose in public. If such details are to be given, Hon'ble Supreme Court
further observed, it would defeat the very purpose of an externment proceeding. The observations, which are relevant for the present purpose, are
found in paragraph 9 and it would be useful for us to refer to them. They are reproduced thus :
“9. These provisions show that the reasons which necessitate or justify the passing of an externment order arise out of extraordinary
circumstances. An order of externment can be passed under clause (a) or (b) of Section 56, and only if, the authority concerned is satisfied that
witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the proposed externee by reason of apprehension on their part as regards
the safety of their person or property. A full and complete disclosure of particulars such as is requisite in an open prosecution will frustrate the very
purpose of an externment proceeding. If the showÂcause notice were to furnish to the proposed externee concrete date like specific dates of
incidents or the names of persons involved in those incidents, it would be easy enough to fix the identity of those who out of fear of injury to their
person or property are unwilling to depose in public. There is a brand of lawless element in society which it is impossible to bring to book by
established methods of judicial trial because in such trials there can be no conviction without legal evidence. And legal evidence is impossible to obtain,
because out of fear of reprisals witnesses are unwilling to depose in public. That explains why Section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited obligation
on the authorities to inform the proposed externee “of the general nature of the material allegations against himâ€. That obligation fixes the limits of
the coÂrelative right of the proposed externee. He is entitled, before an order of externment is passed under Section 56, to know the material
allegations against him and the general nature of those allegations. He is not entitled to be informed of the particulars relating to the material
allegations.â€
37. Now, some doubt may arise about the distinguishing line between “a statement of general nature of material allegations†and “a statement
giving all the details of material allegations.â€. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pandharinath (supra) has removed the doubt by referring to the
illustrations given in its earlier judgment in the case of State of Gujarat & anr etc. v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc. reported in AIR 1958 SC 1468.
The relevant paragraphs read thus :
“12. In State of Gujarat and Another, etc. v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc. (supra), this court, reversing the judgment of the High Court of
Gujarat, rejected the argument that a notice substantially similar to the one in the instant case was bad for vagueness. It was held that the person
proposed to be externed was entitled to be informed of the general nature of the material allegations and not to the particulars of those allegations. As
to the meaning of the phrase “general nature of the material allegationsâ€, it was observed :
“Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that when a person is started to be a 'thief' that allegation is vague. Again, when it is said that
'A' stole a watch from X on a particular day and at a particular place', the allegation can be said to be particular. Again, when it is started that 'X is
seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets' it is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under the last illustration, given above, will come
the allegations, which, according to the Gujarat High Court, suffer from being too general, or vague. Considering it from the point of view of the party
against whom an order of externment is proposed to be passed, it must be emphasised that when he has to tender an explanation to a notice, under
Section 59, he can only give an explanation, which can be of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence, of the action being taken, due
to mala fides, malice or mistaken identity, or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the
notice and the like.â€
“13. We must therefore reject the argument that the particulars contained in the notice are vague. We endorse the view of the High Court that
Criminal Application No. 332 of 1971 in which judgment was delivered on April 29, 1971, by another Division Bench of that court was not correctly
decided, to the extent to which the notice therein was held to be vague. The view taken in that case is inconsistent with the view expressed by this
court in Mehboob Khan's case (supra).â€
38. The illustrations appearing in the aboveÂreferred observations, in our view, should serve sufficient guidance for all about the manner in which the
showÂcause notice must be given by the externing authority and as to how it be scrutinised by the court in it's exercise of power of judicial review of
administrative action or statutory discretion. That would clear up our mind as to how much showÂcause notice speak and what it must avoid speaking
on. The only duty cast upon the externing authority is to inform the proposed externee of the general nature of material allegations against him and the
sphere of corresponding right of the proposed externee to know, we must say, is limited by the object of externment proceedings. The object is to
bring certain kind of bad elements to book who, by their criminal activities, make it impossible or difficult for the criminal justice system to deal with
sternly. In their cases, legal evidence hardly comes forth because witnesses are hesitant to depose in public out of fear to their person or property.
This is the reason why the corresponding right of the proposed externee has been reduced to the minimum possible in law, and that is what lends
sufficiency to showÂcause notice under Section 59(1) of the Act, 1951.
39. On going through the referral order of the Division Bench, we find that these principles of law have already been considered in extenso and have
also been summarised in paragraph 39 of the order. Items no. (2) and (4) of the summary are relevant for the purpose of second question. In item no.
(2), the Division Bench has stated that the law of externment being an extraordinary one and having been made to meet only the exceptional cases
where for the fear of violence to their person or property, the witnesses are unwilling to depose publically against certain bad characters, such
restrains have to be suffered in larger interest of society. In item no. (4), the order states that the externee is only entitled to be informed of the
general nature of the material allegations and neither the externing authority nor the State Government in appeal could be asked to write a reasoned
order and if anyone is to insist upon presence of specific or particular allegations in the showÂcause notice or existence of a reasoned order akin to a
judgment, it would only result in fixing the identity of the witnesses who are otherwise unwilling to come out in public and testify against such bad
elements. We cannot but agree completely with the summary of principles concisely made in the referral order.
40. There have been, however, instances wherein some decisions rendered by the different Division Benches of this Court have made a departure
from the aboveÂreferred principles. These cases are of Mr Pradeep Somnath Gupta v. The State of Maharashtra & ors reported in 2014 ALL MR
(Cri) 4845; Ravi s/o Raju Bhalerao v. The State of Mahartashtra reported in 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 4646; Sayyed Jafar Sayyad Nasir v. The Divisional
Commissioner, Amravati reported in 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 430 and Sanjay s/o Balasaheb Ruptakke v. The State of Maharashtra & ors reported in
2017 ALL MR (Cri) 3983.
41. In Pradeep (supra) to which one of us (S. B. Shukre, J) was party, it has been held that the showÂcause notice which does not make any mention
of the incident and the place of incident and which does not give the material details by summarising confidential statements of the witnesses violates
the principles of natural justice. The view is clearly against the principles crystalised by the Hon'ble Apex Court and which have been stated in the
earlier paragraphs and, therefore, this view is overruled.
42. In Ravi, Sayyad and Sanjay (supra), it has been held that as the showÂcause notice as well as the impugned judgments do not make any reference
regarding recording of inÂcamera statements of witnesses, the impugned orders passed by the externing authority and also the orders passed by the
appellate authority cannot be held to be legally sustainable. This view, with due respect we would say, does not lay down the correct exposition of law.
The principles of law settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and discussed earlier and also the provisions of Section 59 (1) would all show that what is
required to be stated in the showÂcause notice is only the general nature of the material allegations and nothing more. They do not show that the
showÂcause notice must refer to the fact of recording of inÂcamera statements of the persons, rather, they indicate that it would be a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of law if the showÂcause notice states in general terms the material allegations made against the proposed externee.
If the showÂcause notice makes a disclosure in general terms of the material allegations and does not specifically mention the fact of recording of
inÂcamera statements, we must say, it is an enough compliance with the requirement of law. Thus, the view expressed in Ravi, Sayyad Jafar and
Sanjay (supra) and reproduced earlier is overruled.
43. In a given case, however, it may be added that at the most, in order to satisfy itself as to whether or not the general statements of material
allegations made in the notice are based upon some material or not, the High Court may insist upon production of the record including the statements
of witnesses recorded inÂcamera. In such an eventuality, the High Court would examine the record and make it's conclusion about existence or
otherwise of the material on record and stop the inquiry. Reason being that there is a bar upon power of the High Court to also consider sufficiency or
otherwise of the material on record which is behind the action of issuance of showÂcause notice. This bar is of the Wednesbury principle of
unreasonableness expatiated in Om Kumar (supra), Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in AIR SCW 3344, Sanjeev @ Bittoo (supra) and many
more such decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
44. Shri Vyas, learned counsel for one of the petitioners has also referred to us the case of Rupinder Singh Sodhi & anr v. Union of India & ors
reported in AIR 1983 SC 65 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has struck a word of caution in matters where restrains on personal liberty are
placed, observing that all such restrains, if at all they be, have to be commensurate with the object which furnishes their justification and that such
restrains must be minimal constraints of a particular situation, either in nature or duration. These principles of law have also been reflected, one way or
the other, in the already discussed landmark cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issues involved here and as we see, they have gone into
shaping the law on the subject, illumining our minds in the process, leaving neither any dark pockets nor any confusion nor any state of perplexity.
45. Having comprehended clearly the issues central to second question of reference, it is time for us to formalize the answer to it and it is as follows :
It is not necessary to state in the showÂcause notice the details or the particulars of inÂcamera statements recorded by the externing authority and
only the general nature of material allegations is all that is necessary to be said in the showÂcause notice. In other words, it is sufficient compliance
with the requirement of law if the show cause notice refers in general terms to the material allegations against the proposed externee and when the
action is under Section 56 (1) (b) of the Act, 1951 it also generally says that the witnesses are not coming forward to give evidence in public against
the proposed externee due to fear, alarm, danger or harm to the person or property, as the case may be.
46. The Reference is answered in the above terms.